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Punitive military strikes on Syria risk an inhumane
intervention
This week, the US continues to deliberate over the use of military force against the Syrian
regime under Bashar al-Assad, after its alleged use of chemical weapons against civilians.
Jennifer Moore  takes a close look at international law, writing that so long as the UN Security
Council does not agree with intervention, any US action is not permissible under the UN
Charter. She argues that even the principle of Responsibility to Protect would not be justified in
this case, as any action is likely to be short, punitive, and unlikely to end the attacks on Syrian
civilians. 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions do not justif y US missile strikes in Syria in response to chemical weapons
attacks on the civilian population. The humanitarian principle of  distinction prohibits the targeting of
civilians, but does not sanction the decision to launch a military campaign responding to such attacks.
International humanitarian law thus governs the conduct of  war but not its init iation. Rules governing the
init iation of  war occur against a backdrop of  international law f avoring the peacef ul resolution of  conf lict
and the provision of  lif e-saving f orms of  assistance to civilian victims of  war.
To determine if  international law permits the launching of  US military strikes in Syria, it is the UN Charter,
and not the Geneva Conventions, which must guide the US government and the American people. Use of
f orce rules, originating in customary international law, and partially codif ied in the UN Charter, establish the
lawf ul f ramework f or the init iation of  military activit ies by a government, with or without a f ormal declaration
of  war. Whether US military intervention is unilateral or multilateral, short- term or sustained, surgical or f ull
court press, sea or air-based, utilizing Tomahawk missiles or Predator drones, the UN Charter is our
f ramework and our guide.
Article 2, clause 4 of  the UN Charter is the
source of  the general prohibit ion against the
use of  f orce, one of  the cardinal principles of
international law since 1945, given pride of  place in a treaty dedicated to ending the “scourge of  war.” But
the Charter is not starry-eyed about the prospects of  outlawing war, and contemplates two very pragmatic
exceptions to the general prohibit ion. The f irst, explicit ly codif ying a long-standing customary norm, is the
use of  f orce by a state or states in self -def ense, as def ined by Article 51. The second permits certain
military interventions when authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of  the Charter. Until the
United States has been attacked or the Security Council acts, Article 51 and Chapter VII do not give a green
light to US strikes or other military campaigns.
There is one additional although controversial exception to the general prohibit ion against military f orce,
and that is a so-called humanitarian intervention, or a military campaign calculated to stop widespread
attacks on a civilian population, including acts of  genocide, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
The norm of  humanitarian intervention is contested in part because it is not def ined in the UN Charter,
although many scholars and activists would claim it is supported by the Charter ’s central objective to
def end human rights and f undamental f reedoms. Its more contemporary iteration, the Responsibility to
Protect (R2P), was championed by UN member states at the 2005 World Summit. While invoked by the
Security Council and General Assembly in subsequent resolutions, R2P is an emerging standard that has
yet to be codif ied in treaty f orm.
As def ined by Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in 2009, R2P starts with lif e-saving humanitarian relief  f or
the threatened population, and only contemplates military f orce as a last resort. R2P is f undamentally a call
f or non- lethal f orms of  assistance, including rescue, saf e passage, shelter, medicine, f ood and clean water
f or war-af f ected individuals and populations. It impoverishes R2P to def ine it exclusively in military terms,
and yet in common parlance R2P is code f or armed intervention.
Both humanitarian intervention and R2P remain controversial because of  the historical tendency f or military
interventions motivated by the protection of  civilians to result in f urther and protracted suf f ering by
civilians. Without the backing of  the Security Council, humanitarian intervention is a potential rationale f or
military strikes by the United States in Syria. But R2P is a very thin reed on which to base a short- term
military campaign by the US in response to the killing of  Syrian civilians by chemical gas attack. This is so
f or one important reason. A militarized humanitarian intervention must be calculated to protect the civilian
population that is being victimized. It can only be justif ied if  it  is both motivated to stop attacks on the
civilian population and likely in practical terms to have that ef f ect. A military intervention that raises the level
of  civilian risk violates R2P.
R2P is not a f orm of  punishment or a rhetorical device. It does not sanction military retaliation against a
state f or attacking its own civilians, nor does it justif y violence as a symbolic gesture f or expressing
solidarity with that oppressed population. If  the United States launches “punitive,” “surgical,” or “symbolic”
military strikes in Syria and we stop while the civilian population remains at risk, our responsibility to protect
will be unmet. But if  a US military campaign results in greater suf f ering by the civilian population we will have
engaged in an inhumane intervention. In order to f ulf ill the United States’ Responsibility to Protect in Syria,
we must commit ourselves to non- lethal and lif e-saving f orms of  humanitarian assistance f or the Syrian
people.
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